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Abstract
I study optimal housing and portfolio choice under stochastic inﬂation and real interest
rates. Renters allocate ﬁnancial wealth to stocks and bonds with diﬀerent maturities.
Homeowners also choose the mortgage type. I show that hedge demands and ﬁnancial
constraints vary over an investor’s lifetime, giving rise to a pronounced life-cycle pattern
in the optimal housing, stock, bond, and mortgage choice. Young homeowners take an
adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) and invest ﬁnancial wealth predominantly in stocks.
Later in the life cycle bonds play an important role, mainly as a hedge against changing
real interest rates and house prices. Fairly risk-tolerant homeowners still prefer an
ARM, while more risk-averse investors rather choose a combination of an ARM and a
ﬁxed-rate mortgage.
JEL classiﬁcation: G11, E43
Keywords: portfolio choice, mortgage, housing, term structure of interest rates
∗This paper has beneﬁted from discussions with Ulf Axelson, João Cocco, Magnus Dahlquist, Frank de
Jong, Joost Driessen, Bernard Dumas, Peter Englund, Francisco Gomes, Anthony Lynch, Pascal Maenhout,
Massimo Massa, Alex Michaelides, Enrico Perotti, Per Strömberg, and David Yermack, as well as from
seminar participants at the University of Amsterdam, Swedish Institute for Financial Research, Strathclyde,
Uppsala Universitet, Stockholm School of Economics, INSEAD, NYU Stern, the Swedish Central Bank,
Tilburg University, and Göteborgs Universitet. I would like to thank SARA for the use of their supercom-
puter. Contact: ovanheme@stern.nyu.edu. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
For many investors housing is the largest asset, and the mortgage on the house the largest
liability. Both are likely to have a major impact on the optimal ﬁnancial portfolio choice.
This paper shows that besides stocks, bonds and mortgages play an important role in
a homeowner’s ﬁnancial portfolio. Together, the bonds and the mortgage determine the
duration of the overall portfolio, which is important for hedging real interest rate risk. In
addition, the bonds and the mortgage may provide a partial hedge against house price
changes. I show that hedge demands and ﬁnancial constraints vary over an investor’s
lifetime, giving rise to a pronounced life-cycle pattern in the optimal housing, stock, bond,
and mortgage choice.
This paper basically merges two recent strands in the portfolio choice literature. Papers
in the ﬁrst strand investigate life-cycle portfolio choice while taking into account the role
of housing.1 Cocco (2005) investigates the joint decision on owner-occupied housing and
portfolio choice. Yao and Zhang (2005) also include a choice on housing tenure.2 Both
papers restrict the asset menu to stocks and cash, and do not consider a mortgage choice. I
extend these papers by adding bonds with diﬀerent maturities to the asset menu, studying
mortgage choice, and modelling the interaction of the housing return with ﬁnancial asset
returns in a more sophisticated manner. The second strand illustrates the importance of
bonds for a long-term investor. Examples are Brennan and Xia (2002) and Campbell and
Viceira (2001).3 Both papers use a two-factor model similar to mine for the nominal interest
rate. A long-term investor holds bonds not only to exploit the risk premium, but also to
hedge changes in the investment opportunity set. My paper extends these papers to a
life-cycle setting with risky housing and labor income. In addition, I take into account the
housing tenure, house size and mortgage choice.
I consider the following model. An investor receives stochastic, exogenous labor in-
come until retirement and derives utility from both housing and other goods consumption.
Investors dynamically decide on their housing tenure, house size, ﬁnancial portfolio and
1Brueckner (1997) and Flavin and Yamashita (2002) focus on the housing and ﬁnancial portfolio choice
in a static, one-period, mean-variance setting.
2In a 5-period setting, Hu (2005) explicitely models mortgage reﬁnancing charges. Cauly, Pavlov, and
Schwartz (2005) assume a ﬁxed housing position, and study a model where homeowners can sell a fractional
interest in their house.
3Sangvinatsos and Wachter (2005) and Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2006) extend these studies by
allowing for time variation in risk premia. Koijen, Nijman, and Werker (2006) also take into account labor
income, but in their terminal wealth utility speciﬁcation they abstract from the empirically-observed, hump-
shaped age pattern.
1other goods consumption. For homeowners the house not only provides housing services,
but also entails a risky investment. An investor can change his tenure and house size only
at a transaction cost. This cost is larger when moving to an owner-occupied house than
to a rental house. Renters choose how to allocate ﬁnancial wealth to stocks, bonds with
diﬀerent maturities, and cash. Financial positions can be adjusted without transaction cost.
Negative positions are precluded. Homeowners also choose the mortgage type and size. A
homeowner may take a mortgage loan up to the market value of the house minus a down
payment. I allow for an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM), a ﬁxed-rate mortgage (FRM),
and a combination of the two (hybrid mortgage). A homeowner can adjust his mortgage
type and size at zero cost, as is typically the case for a home line of credit. The ARM is
modelled as a negative cash position, and the FRM as a negative position in a long-term
bond.
For the asset price dynamics I extend the Brennan and Xia (2002) model with a house
price and labor income process. Nominal bonds are priced by a two-factor model for the
term structure of interest rates. I use expected inﬂation and real interest rate as factors. In
contrast to a one-factor model, this model provides a rationale for holding nominal bonds
with diﬀerent maturities. Importantly, it also allows me to investigate the implications
of diﬀerent types of mortgages. I also model unexpected inﬂation, house price risk, labor
income risk and stock market risk, leading to a total of six sources of uncertainty. This
structure enables me to realistically examine the interaction of diﬀerent asset prices. The
parameter values for these price dynamics are largely based on estimates by Van Hemert,
De Jong and Driessen (2005), who use US data. In accordance with other papers,4 they
ﬁnd a faster mean-reversion in the real interest rate than in the expected inﬂation rate.
This turns out to be crucial for the choice among bonds with diﬀerent maturities and the
mortgage choice.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. The motivation to hold
risky assets varies over an investor’s lifetime, giving rise to a clear life-cycle pattern in his
optimal house, stock, bond and mortgage choice. An investor starts adult life with little
ﬁnancial wealth and large human capital, making him severely borrowing constrained. The
investor rents the house he lives in and only holds a small buﬀer capital as ﬁnancial wealth.
Over time more labor income is earned and the investor starts to save for the down payment
on an owner-occupied house. In this period he becomes less borrowing constrained, but is
still very short-sale constrained. Taking into account his large human capital, the investor
4See e.g. Brennan and Xia (2002) or Campbell and Viceira (2001).
2chooses an almost 100% stock allocation in order to exploit the equity premium, which is
set at 4% in my analysis.
Per-period costs for a given house size are smaller when owning than when renting.
This makes the investor so eager to buy his ﬁrst house that the move from a rental to an
owner-occupied house often involves moving to a smaller house, for which he is just able
to pay the required down payment. The young homeowner optimally chooses an ARM of
maximum size, irrespective of risk aversion. This allows a homeowner to exploit the risk
premium on stocks and bonds.
As a homeowner builds up more ﬁnancial wealth, he typically decides to move to a
bigger owner-occupied house. With the larger physical (ﬁnancial plus housing) capital and
s m a l l e rh u m a nc a p i t a l ,t h ed e s i r et ot a k er i s k and exploit risk premia decreases, while the
desire to hedge against changing investment opportunities becomes more important. Ini-
tially a homeowner chooses a long-term bond for this hedge, because it has the largest
absolute loading on real interest rate risk. When approaching retirement age the allocation
starts to shift towards short-term bonds, which have the larger loading on real interest
rate risk relative to expected inﬂation risk. A fairly aggressive homeowner will still hold
a considerable amount of long-term bonds and stocks at retirement. A more risk-averse
homeowner, who is more concerned with hedging real interest rate risk, will almost com-
pletely shift to short-term bonds. Moreover, to further improve the eﬀectiveness of the
real interest rate hedge, he desires to short-sell the long-term bond. The optimal mortgage
for this more risk-averse homeowner consequently changes from a pure ARM to a hybrid
mortgage, modelled as a short position in both cash and a long-term bond.
Towards the end of his lifetime the investor sells his house and starts renting again.
This enables him to consume all his wealth, including the down payment on the previously
owned house. In anticipation of this sell, the investor adjusts his ﬁnancial portfolio to hedge
against house price falls.
In addition to the above-mentioned papers, this paper also relates to Campbell and
Cocco (2003). In this paper the choice between an FRM and an ARM involves a trade
oﬀ between what they refer to as wealth and income risk. An FRM has a variable real
value, leading to wealth risk. An ARM has an almost ﬁxed real value, but has, in their set
up, short-term variability in real payments, leading to income risk. My mortgage analysis
diﬀers from Campbell and Cocco (2003) in several important ways. Campbell and Cocco
(2003) do not consider stocks and bonds, and assume all other ﬁnancial wealth is invested
3in cash. In contrast, I consider mortgage choice as part of the overall ﬁnancial portfolio
choice. While Campbell and Cocco (2003) incorporate persistent shocks to the expected
inﬂation only, I allow for persistent shocks in the real interest rate as well. Together the
bonds and mortgage determine the duration of the overall portfolio, which is important for
hedging real interest rate risk. Even though there is no income risk of the above kind in my
model, these considerations make the choice between an ARM and an FRM interesting in
my set up. Moreover, in contrast to Campbell and Cocco (2003), I allow for a tenure and
house size choice, which enables me to study mortgage choice in a broader context.
Finally this paper relates to Van Hemert, De Jong and Driessen (2005), who study a
homeowner’s optimal portfolio choice assuming (i) utility of terminal wealth, (ii) no labor
income, (iii) ﬁxed housing investment. Similar to this paper, they use a two-factor model
to decribe bond prices and model an ARM (FRM) as a short position in cash (a long-term
bond). In contrast to Van Hemert, De Jong and Driessen (2005), I use a life-cycle setting
with stochastic labor income and ﬁnd a pronounced life-cylce pattern in optimal choices.
Moreover, I allow for a tenure and house size choice.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
discusses the estimation of the model parameters. Section 4 contains the main results and
section 5 concludes.
2 The economic model
I study optimal ﬁnancial planning for an investor from time 0 to time T =6 0years,
corresponding to age 20 to 80. I abstract from longevity risk. The investor faces a choice
regarding (i) tenure, (ii) house size, (iii) allocation of ﬁnancial assets, including a choice
on mortgage type, and (iv) consumption. I interpreted house size as a one-dimensional
representation of the quality of the house. Each period the investor can either stay in the
same (size) house or move and pay some transaction costs. During working life the investor
receives labor income which I assume is exogenous.5
5Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992) show that endogenous labor income may increase the optimal risk
taking in the ﬁnancial portfolio.
42.1 Preferences
The investor derives utility from both the housing services and other goods consumption,
c. The real price of consumption goods is chosen to be the numeraire and the real price
of a unit of housing is denoted q (with q0 ≡ 1). I denote the house size at time t by Ht.
Following Cocco (2005), and Yao and Zhang (2005) I represent preferences over housing














where Ut is lifetime utility, β is the subjective discount rate, γ is the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion, and ψ is the relative preference for housing consumption.6
2.2 Asset price dynamics
I consider an economy with six sources of uncertainty represented by innovations in six
Brownian motions. I assume the investor takes price processes as given. Furthermore, I
assume that the risk premia on the sources of uncertainty are constant. Financial asset,
mortgage and house prices are determined by the dynamics of the ﬁrst ﬁve sources of
uncertainty. For this I use the setup of Van Hemert, De Jong and Driessen (2005) who in
turn, extend Brennan and Xia (2002) with an additional source of uncertainty to capture
house price risk. The ﬁve variables that determine asset prices are: nominal stock return S,
instantaneous real interest rate r, instantaneous expected inﬂation rate π, nominal house
price Q, and the price level Π. The equations driving these variables are given by
dS/S =[ Rf + σSλS]dt + σSdzS,( 2 )
dr = κ(¯ r − r)dt + σrdzr,( 3 )
dπ = α(¯ π − π)dt + σπdzπ,( 4 )
dQ/Q =
£
Rf + σQλQ − rimp¤
dt + σQdzQ,( 5 )
dΠ/Π = πdt+ σΠdzΠ,( 6 )
6In contrast, Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005), and Piazessi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2006) use the more
general constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function in their studies on the role of housing in asset
pricing. Piazessi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2006) estimate a value for the intratemporal elasticity parameter only
slightly above one; the value that corresponds to the special case of Cobb-Douglas preferences. To enhance
comparison with the more-related papers of Cocco (2005), and Yao and Zhang (2005), I use Cobb-Douglas
preferences, even though both utility speciﬁcations are computationally feasible.
5where Rf is the return on the nominal risk free asset (cash), λS and λQ are nominal risk
premia, rimp is the imputed rent, dz’s are standard Brownian motions and the σ’s capture
the volatility of the processes. The risk premium on the house is corrected by the imputed
rent, representing the beneﬁts from the housing services (as measured by the market). We
can orthogonalize (5) and (6) as
dQ/Q =
¡
Rf + θ0λ − rimp¢
dt + θ0dz,( 7 )
dΠ/Π = πdt+ ξ0dz + ξudzu,( 8 )
with θ =( θS,θr,θπ,θv)
0, ξ =( ξS,ξr,ξπ,ξv)
0, λ =( λS,λ r,λ π,λ v)
0 and z =( zS,z r,z π,z v),
where dzv is orthogonal to dzS, dzr and dzπ and dzu is orthogonal to dz.D e ﬁning the








Q = θ0ρθ and σ2
Π = ξ0ρξ + ξ2
u.
Brennan and Xia (2002) show that the nominal price at time t of a discount bond with
a $1 nominal payoﬀ maturing at time T, denoted as P,s a t i s ﬁes
dP/P =( Rf − Bσrλr − Cσπλπ)dt − Bσrdzr − Cσπdzπ,( 1 0 )
where B (T − t)=κ−1 ¡
1 − e−κ(T−t)¢
,a n dC (T − t)=α−1 ¡
1 − e−α(T−t)¢
are functions of
the time to maturity T − t. The return processes for bonds with diﬀerent maturities diﬀer
only in their loadings on dzr and dzπ. When there are no constraints on position size, any
desired combination of loadings on dzr and dzπ can be accomplished by positions in any
two bonds with diﬀerent maturities.
Real returns for stocks, bonds and the house can easily be obtained using (8) and
applying Ito’s lemma. I use uppercase letters for nominal variables and the corresponding
small case letter for their real counterpart. We have Rf = r+π−ξ0λ−ξuλu and for example




S − ξ0λ∗ − ξuλ∗
u
¢
dt + σSdzS − ξ0dz − ξudzu.( 1 1 )
where the ∗ refers to a real risk premia, i.e. λ∗ = λ − ρξ and λ∗
u = λu − ξu.
62.3 Investment Opportunity Set
The menu of available ﬁnancial assets consists of stocks, 3-year bonds, 10-year bonds and
cash. The two bonds are assumed to be zero-coupon bonds. I impose short-sale constraints
on these assets. In addition, for homeowners the house not only provides housing services,
but also entails a (risky) investment. Notice in equation (11) that the real risk premium for
stocks is ﬁxed and in particular independent of the expected inﬂation rate, π.T h e s a m e
holds for the real risk premium on the house, nominal bonds and cash, which implies that
the real investment opportunity set in my model is independent of the prevailing expected
inﬂation rate.
An investor cannot borrow against his human capital. However, homeowners can take
a mortgage loan up to a fraction 1 − δ of the market value of the house, where δ is the
minimum down payment fraction. He can use the proceeds to consume or to invest in stocks,
bonds or cash. I include the (negative) market value of the mortgage in my deﬁnition of
ﬁnancial wealth, which therefore can become negative. Total (ﬁnancial plus housing) wealth,
however, cannot be less than the minimum down payment of δ times the value of the house.
Following Cocco (2005) I assume that a homeowner can costlessly adjust the mortgage, as
is typically the case for a home line of credit.
A homeowner can choose between an adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM), a ﬁxed-rate
mortgage (FRM), and a hybrid mortgage which is a combination of an ARM and an FRM.
I model an ARM (FRM) as a short position in cash (10-year bond), i.e. I assume the
(relative) increase in the market value of the loan equals the return on cash (10-year bond).
Since I also allow for hybrid mortgages, the investor basically can take a negative cash and
10-year bond position, each and added up not to exceed (1 − δ)t i m e st h em a r k e tv a l u eo f
the house.
2.4 Labor income
The sixth source of uncertainty captures labor income risk. Real labor income, l, is assumed
to be subject to permanent shocks only.7 In addition, real labor income has a deterministic
7Viceira (2001), Yao and Zhang (2005) and Munk and Sørensen (2005) also assume stochastic shocks to
permanent labor income only. Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005), Campbell and Cocco (2003) and Cocco
(2005) also allow for transitory, individual labor income shocks.
7component g (t)dt that captures the hump-shaped pattern of labor income
dl/l = g(t)dt + σldzl for t ≤ 45 (12)
l =0 for t>45 (13)
I assume that dzl is orthogonal to dz and dzu, which implies that labor income shocks are
completely unhedgeable.
After retirement at time 45 (age 65) labor income is assumed to be zero. I have ex-
perimented with diﬀerent assumptions regarding pension income and bequest motives and
found that with substantial pension income and without bequest motive investors save un-
realistically little in my Cobb-Dougles utility framework. Cocco (2005) and Yao and Zhang
(2005) have pension income and a bequest motive. However, the empirical evidence for the
latter is mixed; see for example Hurd (1989) and Bernheim (1991) for a positive and nega-
tive view on a strong bequest motive respectively. In contrast, I choose to report results for
the no pension income and no bequest motive case, and therefore study a investor who saves
for his own retirement and eventually consumes the (retirement) wealth he accumulated.
Since I abstract from longevity risk, the investor is able to exhaust his savings fully.
2.5 Housing costs
Renters pay a ﬁxed fraction ζ of the market value of the house as rent. Homeowners have to
pay maintenance costs equal to a fraction m of the market value of the house. Typically I will
have ζ>m , implying that the per period per unit housing costs are lower for homeowners.
When moving from one house to another a one-time transaction cost is incurred. I assume
this cost is equal to a fraction νrent (νown) of the market value of the new house when he
rents (owns) the new house. We will have νown >ν rent.
2.6 Optimization problem
I denote real housing wealth by wH and real ﬁnancial wealth by wF.Id e ﬁne the indicator
variable I as being one (zero) when the investor is currently owning (renting). Total real
wealth, w,i st h e ng i v e nb y
w = wF + IwH (14)
8For homeowners ﬁnancial wealth includes the mortgage and can be negative. The evolution




F (x) − ξ0λ∗ − ξuλ∗
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ª













qwHdz − ξ0wHdz − ξuwHdzu,
where μe
F and μe
H are the excess nominal return on ﬁnancial and housing wealth respectively,
and σF and σq are vectors containing the factor loadings on dz for the nominal return on
ﬁnancial and housing wealth respectively. We have μe
H = θ0λ∗ and σq = θ.W eh a v et h a t
μe
F and σF are independent of wF and wH, but they do depend on the chosen portfolio
shares, denoted by x =
¡
xstocks,x 3ybond,x 10ybond,x cash¢
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.( 1 8 )
When the investor moves at time t and the new tenure state and house size are denoted by
Inew
t and Hnew
t respectively, the change in housing wealth is given by dwH
t = qt (Hnew
t − Ht).
Denoting wH,new ≡ qtHnew




t for It =0 , Inew






t for It =0 , Inew





t for It =1 , Inew







t for It =1 , Inew
t =1(own to own) (22)
The state variables for the investor’s investment problem are given by I, wF, wH, l, q, r and
t. From equations (15)-(22) it is clear that a housing and other goods consumption strategy
{ct,H t}
T




if and only if the consumption
9strategy {τct,τH t}
T





From equation (1) we see that the lifetime utility function, Ut, is homogeneous of degree
1 − γ in {ct,H t}
T





= w1−γJ (1 − Ih,h,y,q,r,t).( 2 3 )
where h = wH/w and y = w/l. Similarly, from equations (15)-(22) it is clear that consump-
tion strategy {ct,H t}
T




i fa n do n l yi f
the consumption strategy {ct,τH t}
T




for any τ>0. Exploiting that the lifetime utility function, Ut, is homogeneous of degree
(1 − γ)ψ in {Ht}
T
















˜ J (I,y,h,r,t).( 2 5 )
So two state variables are separable, which greatly helps for solving for the optimal strategy.
2.7 Solution technique
Given the ﬁnite nature of the problem a solution exists. We have that ˜ J (IT,y T,h T,r T,T)=
0, since the investor derives no utility from leaving a bequest. A grid over y, h, r and t is
chosen to numerically solve for ˜ J (It,y t,h t,r t,t) and the optimal choices Inew
t , Hnew
t , ct and
xt backwards in time. Without loss of generality we normalize wt =1and qt =1in each
step. Thus I determine ˜ J (It,y t,h t,r t,t) by solving






















˜ J (It+∆t,y t+∆t,h t+∆t,r t+∆t,t+ dt)|F
⎤
⎦ (26)
with F = {wt =1 ,q t =1 ,y t,h t,r t,t}
where ∆t is the step size of the grid over time. To determine ˜ J (It+∆t,y t+∆t,h t+∆t,r t+∆t,t+ ∆t)
for values of yt+∆t, ht+∆t and rt+∆t not on the grid, I use linear interpolation on log( ˜ J).T h e
expectation is evaluated using a 3-point Gaussian quadrature for each of the six sources of
uncertainty represented by the six Brownian motions. For the optimization I use the Down-
10hill Simplex Method in Multidimensions (Nelder and Mead (1965)) which doesn’t use any
derivative information and is robust to diﬀerent starting values. The chosen timing of events
in each period is the following.
1. The investor starts period t with normalised total wealth of wt =1and house price
qt =1 . The state variables yt and ht determine the labor income rate lt = wt/yt,a n d
the current house size Ht = wtht/qt respectively.
2. The investor chooses the new tenure state, Inew
t , and house size Hnew
t .W h e nHt 6=
Hnew
t or It 6= Inew
t , the investor chose to move and transaction costs will be incurred.
Irrespective of whether the investor moved or not, rental or maintenance cost are
incurred. The total housing costs, denoted costst,a r eg i v e nb y










where Ind{move} is one (zero) when the investor moved (did not move).
3. The investor chooses consumption ct, such that the total wealth after consumption
and housing costs, ˆ wt, is at least zero for a renter or the compulsory down payment
on the house for a homeowner,
ˆ wt = wt − ct∆t − costst ≥ Inew
t δHnew
t qt. (28)
4. Then the allocation at time t over stocks (stockt), 3-year bond (3ybondt), 10-year
bond (10ybondt)a n dc a s h( casht) is chosen under the following constraints
0 ≤ stockt ≤ ˆ wt − Inew
t δHnew
t qt (29)




t (1 − δ)Hnew
t qt ≤ 10ybondt ≤ ˆ wt − Inew
t δHnew
t qt (31)
casht =ˆ wt − stockt − 3ybondt − 10ybondt − Inew
t Hnew
t qt (32)
Since a homeowner can take a mortgage of only a fraction (1 − δ) of the house value,
his risky asset allocation cannot exceed ˆ wt − δHnew
t qt.
115. He earns a return on the ﬁnancial assets and receives labor income resulting in
wt+∆t = casht+∆t + stockt+∆t +3 ybondt+∆t +1 0 ybondt+∆t + (33)
Inew
t Hnew
t qt+∆t + lt+∆t∆t (34)
It+∆t = Inew
t (35)
yt+∆t = wt+∆t/lt+∆t (36)
ht+∆t = Hnew
t qt+∆t/wt+∆t (37)
Ic h o o s e∆t =1 /12,i . e .am o n t h .F o ry Ic h o o s ea60 point grid on [∆t,20].F o rh I
choose an equally-spaced grid on [0,4] with step size 0.1.
3 Calibration
The parameter values for the asset price dynamics and labor income process are presented in
Table I. The values for the real riskless rate, expected inﬂation rate and unexpected inﬂation
rate are mostly taken from Van Hemert, De Jong and Driessen (2005). They use quarterly
data on US nominal interest rates and inﬂation from 1973Q1 to 2003Q4 and employ a
Kalman ﬁlter technique. For more details I refer to Van Hemert, De Jong and Driessen
(2005). A faster mean reversion in the real interest rate than in the expected inﬂation rate
is in accordance with e.g. Brennan and Xia (2002) and Campbell and Viceira (2001). In
addition to the parameters provided by Van Hemert, De Jong and Driessen (2005), I set
the nominal unexpected inﬂation premium, λu,e q u a lt oz e r o .
Also similar to Van Hemert, De Jong and Driessen (2005), parameter values for stock
and house price dynamics are based on quarterly US data from 1980Q2 to 2003Q4. For the
stock data I use an index comprising all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ ﬁrms.8 For house
price data I use a repeated sales index for houses in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago and San
Francisco.9 I have no data on market imputed rent, but for the ﬁnancial asset allocation
θvλv −rimp and not λv and rimp seperately is relevant. I can estimate θvλv −rimp from the
data and simply set rimp equal to the mean real interest rate ¯ r. As Van Hemert, De Jong
and Driessen (2005) I scale house price shocks with a factor 5.6 around its mean to reﬂect
the fact that house prices are subject to idiosyncratic shocks in addition to aggregate shocks.
In contrast to Van Hemert, De Jong and Driessen (2005), here I calculate correlations with
8I would like to thank Kenneth R. French for making this data available at his website.
9I would like to thank the Case-Shiller-Weiss company for providing us with this data.
12Table I. Choice of asset price parameters.
The table reports calibrated values for the parameters that drive asset price and labor income
dynamics.
Parameter Estimate (Alternative)
Stock return process: dS/S =( Rf + σSλS)dt + σSdzS
σS 0.1748
λS 0.2288










House price process: dQ/Q =
¡
Rf + σQλQ − rimp¢

































Table II Correlation matrix for (dzS,dz r,dz π,dz Q,dz Π,dz l)0
dzS dzr dzπ dzQ dzΠ dzl
dzs 1
dzr −0.1643 1
dzπ 0.0544 −0.2323 1
dzQ 0.0826 −0.1608 0.3075 1
dzΠ −0.0809 0.1294 −0.0090 −0.4355 1
dzl 00000 1
13house price innovation on a yearly instead of aq u a r t e r l yb a s i s .Ic h o o s et od os ob e c a u s e
house prices may adjust slower to news than ﬁnancial assets. Extending the calibration
h o r i z o nb e y o n do n ey e a rm a k e sl i t t l ed i ﬀerence. Nominal house price changes are found to be
negatively correlated with real interest rate shocks and positively correlated with expected
inﬂation shocks. The scaling of house prices might lead to coeﬃcients of correlation with
ﬁnancial asset prices that are biased upwards in size. As robustness check I investigate model
outcomes with the alternative assumption of correlations between housing and ﬁnancial
assets equal to zero.
I consider a horizon of T =6 0years, corresponding to age 20 to 80. The investor is
assumed to retire at time 45 or age 65. I follow Munk and Sørensen (2005) by adapting the
estimated labor income proﬁle of Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005) to a continuous-time
setting. The deterministic part of the change in labor income is given by
g (t)=b +2 c(t + 20) + 3d(t + 20)
2 .( 3 8 )
where t +2 0is the age. Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005) estimate b, c and d for three
groups characterized by the highest level of education achieved: "No High school", "High
school" and "College". I focus on the "High school" group. I follow Munk and Sørensen
(2005) and set the income rate volatility at σl =0 .10. Recall that after retirement (at age
65 or time 45) labor income is assumed to be zero. Table II provides the implied correlation
matrix of the stochastic vector (dzS,dz r,dz π,dz Q,dz Π,dz l)0.
Given the asset price dynamics in Table I we have the following hedge portfolios. First,
the portfolio hedging changes in real interest rate risk consists of a long position in the 3-
year bond and a short position in the 10-year bond. This is a direct consequence of a faster
mean reversion in the real interest rate than in the expected inﬂation rate. For example
from equation (18) I see that a C (10)/C (3) = $2.78 position in the 3-year bond, a −$1.00
position in a 10-year bond (and −$0.78 cash position) implies a zero loading on expected
inﬂation shocks and a negative loading of [−2.78B (3) − (−1.00)B (10)]σr = −2.13σr on
real interest rate shocks. So when the real interest rates decreases by 1% (and consequently
the investment opportunity set deteriorates), then this bond portfolio shows a positive
nominal return of 2.13%. Second, the portfolio best oﬀsetting changes in the nominal house
price implied by the calibrated parameter values is a short stock, short 3-year bond, long
10-year bond (and short cash) portfolio. This can be easily obtained by solving σF = −θ
in equation (18). For an investor expecting to downsize his housing position this is the
appropriate hedge portfolio. For an investor who is expecting to buy a (bigger) house in
14Table III. Choice of other parameters.
The table reports calibrated values for the other parameters.
Variable Symbol Value
Risk aversion γ 3 or 9
Housing preferences ψ 0.20
Subjective discount rate β 0.96
Rental rate ζ 6.0%
Maintenance rate m 1.5%
Move to rent cost νrent 1.0%
Move to own cost νown 6.0%
Minimum down payment δ 0.20
the near future the opposite position is needed. However, we should bear in mind that it
is just a partial hedge and that most of the housing risk is idiosyncratic and unhedgeable.
Third, the ﬁnancial portfolio best hedging unexpected inﬂation risk consist of short stocks,
short 3-year bonds, long 10-year bonds. However, the part of unexpected inﬂation that can
be hedged with ﬁnancial assets is small. By assumption labor income risk cannot be hedged
at all.
Table III provides the other parameter values. For the risk aversion parameter I examine
two values: γ =3for an aggressive and γ =9for a more risk-averse investor. Housing
preferences are ψ =0 .2, which is the same as in Yao and Zhang (2005) (in contrast, Cocco
(2005) chooses ψ =0 .1). The subjective discount rate is set at β =0 .96.F o l l o w i n g Y a o
and Zhang (2005), the rent rate is ζ =6 % , maintenance costs are m =1 .5%, transaction
c o s t sw h e nm o v i n gt oo w na r eνown =6 %and the down payment on the house is δ =2 0 %
(Cocco (2005) chooses 1%, 8% and 15% for m, νown and δ respectively). Yao and Zhang
(2005) assume a zero transaction cost for moving to a rental house. Taking into account the
cost of for example moving furniture and in-house painting, I consider a modest νrent =1 %
more reasonable.
4R e s u l t s
I solved the model presented in Section 2 using calibrated parameter values presented in
Section 3. The solution comprises the optimal choice for tenure, house size, ﬁnancial port-
folio and consumption conditional on the state. The non-separable state variables for the
problem are, the current tenure indicator, I, wealth to labor income ratio,y,h o u s i n gt o
wealth ratio, h, real interest rate, r, and time. The number of state variables is too large
too show the full solution in one or two graphs. Instead I illustrate the model implications
15in other ways. Most importantly, I simulate paths for the non-separable state variables
using derived optimal choices and doing so also simultaneously obtain values for the choice
variables and separable state-variables (in particular total wealth). I will show results for
the mean investor, determined by averaging state and choice variables for a 1000 (simu-
lated) investors of equal age. As starting values for the non-separable state variables at age
20 Ic h o o s eI0 =0 ,i . e .ar e n t e r ,y0 =1 /12, i.e. starting wealth equal to one month salary,
h0 =3 0 , i.e. a rental house worth 30 times the starting wealth, r0 =¯ r, i.e. the real interest
rate is at his long-run average. I normalise total wealth and the house price at age 20,i . e .
w0 =1and q0 =1 . In addition to the simulation exercise I will illustrate the impact of
house size on optimal choices by varying the housing to wealth ratio, h,a n dﬁxing the other
state variables.
Figure I shows consumption and house size for the mean investor with risk aversion
parameter γ =3 . These are the two variables that enter the investor’s lifetime utility
function as presented in equation (1). Figure II shows the annualised move rate for the
mean investor and the fraction of investors owning the house they live in. Young investors
have large human capital and little wealth, which makes them borrowing constraint. Over
time the investor’s wage increase and we see in Figure I both housing and other goods
consumption rise between age 20 and 40. In Figure II we see that no investor owns in
this phase of life. Investors have too little wealth saved to pay the down payment on a
reasonable size house. Most investors move too bigger rental houses in this period though.
Recall that moves are generated for endogenous reasons only in my model. Around age
40 investors buy their ﬁrst home. Most of the time this is a smaller home than the one
they were renting just before. We can see this by the decline in house size in Figure I
or the many moves down around this age in Figure II. Owning involves lower per period
costs than renting which makes investors eager to buy, even if they have not enough wealth
to pay for the down payment of a house as big as the one they are renting. Around age
50 most investors own the house they live in. The mean house size rises until age 60,i s
then fairly constant until age 70, and then starts decreasing again. Since I do not have a
bequest motive, investors want to consume all their wealth before they die. Because of the
compulsory down payment on the house, the investor optimally decreases house size (and
therefore down payment) and eventually starts renting towards the end of his life. In Figure
II the move from own to rental house is visible by the large moving rate around age 78.
Because lower per period housing than rental costs, housing wealth is released fairly late in
life. This causes consumption to be large in the last period of life.
16Figure I: Housing and other goods consumption for the mean γ =3investor
Values are based on the mean of a 1000 simulations with I0 =0 , y0 =1 /12, h0 =3 0and r0 =¯ r as
start values at age 20. I normalise w0 = q0 =1 .















































Figure II: Move rate and fraction owning for the mean γ =3investor
Values are based on the mean of a 1000 simulations with I0 =0 , y0 =1 /12, h0 =3 0and r0 =¯ r as
start values at age 20. I normalise w0 = q0 =1 . The move rate is annualised.











































17Figure III: Portfolio choice and wealth for the mean γ =3investor
Values are based on the mean of a 1000 simulations with I0 =0 , y0 =1 /12, h0 =3 0and r0 =¯ r as
start values at age 20. I normalise w0 = q0 =1 .











































Figure IV: Portfolio choice and wealth for the mean γ =9investor
Values are based on the mean of a 1000 simulations with I0 =0 , y0 =1 /12, h0 =3 0and r0 =¯ r as
start values at age 20. I normalise w0 = q0 =1 .











































18Next I’ll discuss the portfolio choice and wealth accumulation for the mean investor
with risk aversion parameter γ =3and γ =9 , presented in Figures III and IV respectively.
Portfolio shares add up to one. The (negative) mortgage exactly cancels against the part
of housing wealth that exceeds the dashed, horizontal line for the total portfolio share
equals one. Consequently, net housing wealth is exactly the part of housing wealth that is
underneath this dashed, horizontal line. I also plot total wealth.
In the ﬁrst years after age 20 the investor has very little wealth. Both the aggressive γ =
3 and the more risk-averse γ =9investor choose a fairly conservative portfolio, considering
their huge human capital. Because labor income and rent costs are risky, the holding of some
wealth is partially motivated as a buﬀer stock. The investor cannot hedge against rental (i.e.
house price) increases because this mainly involves a negative 10-year bond position. Labor
income shocks cannot be hedged either. Instead the investor holds bonds to hedge real
interest rate shocks and some stocks to exploit the equity premium. The aggressive γ =3
investor mainly holds 3-year bonds for the hedge against real interest rate risk. The more
risk-averse γ =9has a larger hedge demand and chooses 10-year bonds, that have a larger
absolute loading on real interest rate risk. Between age 35 and 40 somewhat more wealth is
accumulated and the buﬀer stock role of the wealth holding becomes less relevant. Wealth
is still small compared to human capital though, creating a desire to leverage risk taking in
the ﬁnancial portfolio. Since stocks have the largest risk premium, most investment is in
stocks in this period.
Around age 40 a house is purchased. Both the γ =3and the γ =9investor choose
a pure adjustable-rate mortgage at this point in life, reﬂecting the desire to leverage the
risk exposure. The ﬁnancial portfolio still consists mainly of stocks, but there is also a
small holding of 10-year bonds. The purpose of this 10-year bond holding is again to hedge
real interest changes. A 3-year bond has a larger relative loading on real interest rate
shocks (relative to expected inﬂation shocks), but 10-year bonds have a larger absolute
loading on real interest rate shocks. The latter is preferred by the 40 year old investor who
still has a large human capital creating a desire to leverage the stock exposure which in
turn leaves little ﬁnancial wealth for hedging purposes. The hedging demand is bigger for
t h em o r er i s ka v e r s eγ =9investor. As wealth is accumulated between age 40 and 65 and
human capital is capitalised, the desire for leveraged stock exposure decreases and the hedge
demand increases. For the γ =3investor this results in increasing 10-year bond holdings.
The γ =9investor, who has less demand for stocks and therefore more ﬁnancial wealth
available for hedging real interest rate risk, gradually switches to 3-year bonds between age
1955 and 65.I nf a c t ,t h e10-year bond position becomes negative, indicating that not a pure
adjustable-rate mortgage, but a hybrid mortgage is optimal here. The optimal mortgage
choice at retirement is consistent with results presented in Van Hemert De Jong and Driessen
(2005), who abstract from labor income. They show that there is a large welfare loss when
no hybrid mortgage is available and the investor has to choose either an ARM or an FRM.
Even though the main motivation for holding bonds is the hedge against real interest
changes, there is an additional eﬀect. The investor takes into account he will downsize his
housing wealth and eventually rent again during retirement. This creates a motive to hedge
against falling house prices. As discussed in section 3 this calls for a long 10-year bond and a
short 3-year bond position. In Figure V I present portfolio shares for a γ =3investor under
the alternative assumption of zero correlation between the house price and ﬁnancial asset
prices. Indeed the 10-year bond allocation is lower and the 3-year bond allocation larger
without this additional hedge demand. This hedge demand is also detectable in Figures III
and IV, where the 10-year bond position decreases and the 3-year bond position increases
once the house is sold. Further comparing Figures III and V we see little diﬀerences between
the two graphs earlier in life, indicating that hedging house price risk with ﬁnancial assets
does not play a very important role in the accumulation phase of life.10
Having illustrated the model implications for the mean investor using a simulation
analysis, I now turn my attention to the impact of house size on optimal portfolio choice.
Table IV shows the optimal portfolio choice for a homeowner at retirement age (65)f o r
diﬀerent housing to wealth ratios. Again I consider both an aggressive γ =3(Panel A)
and a more risk-averse γ =9(Panel B) investor. The wealth to labor income ratio and the
real interest rate are ﬁxed and set at the mean value of the previous simulation exercise.
That is, y =1 2and r =¯ r for both the γ =3and γ =9investor. Notice that the
housing allocation Hnew
t qt/ˆ wt is slightly above the housing wealth ratio because the latter
is measured relative to start of period wealth (wt)w h i l et h eﬁrst is measured relative to
wealth after consumption and housing costs ( ˆ wt). I also report the wealth equivalent value
deﬁned as the wealth needed to attain the same utility as with the optimal housing to
wealth ratio and 100 wealth. I have








,( 3 9 )
where I use hoptimal for the housing to wealth ratio that is optimal given the values of the
10As Sinai and Souleles (2005) notice, owning itself may provide a hedge against future housing costs risk,
w h i c hi nt u r nm i g h ti n ﬂuence the tenure decision.
20Figure V: Portfolio choice and wealth for the mean γ =3investor (completely
idiosyncratic house risk)
Values are based on the mean of a 1000 simulations with I0 =0 , y0 =1 /12, h0 =3 0and r0 =¯ r as
start values at age 20. I normalise w0 = q0 =1 . I use the alternative assumption of zero correlation
between the house price and asset prices, as presented in the third column of Table I.











































Table IV. Financial portfolio choice for diﬀerent housing to wealth ratios
The table presents optimal ﬁnancial portfolio choice for a homeowner of age 65 with a wealth to
labor income ratio equal to the mean of the simulation analysis, an interest rate equal to the long
run mean ¯ r and housing to wealth ratios ranging from 0.2 to 0.8.I na d d i t i o ni tp r e s e n t st h ew e a l t h
equivalent value, deﬁned as the wealth needed to attain the same utility as with the optimal housing
to wealth ratio and 100 wealth. Move indicates an investor optimally chooses to change house size.
Panel A: the investor has risk aversion γ =3
Variable h =0 .1 h =0 .2 h =0 .3 h =0 .4 h =0 .5 h =0 .6 h =0 .7 h =0 .8 h =0 .9
weq move 101.55 100.49 100.00 100.12 100.67 101.40 102.04 move
Hnew
t qt/ ˆ wt move 0.21 0.31 0.41 0.51 0.61 0.71 0.81 move
stockt move 0.38 0.35 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.27 move
3ybondt move 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.00 0.00 move
10ybondt move 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.44 0.52 0.56 0.56 move
casht move −0.16 −0.24 −0.32 −0.40 −0.48 −0.56 −0.64 move
Panel B: the investor has risk aversion γ =9
Variable h =0 .1 h =0 .2 h =0 .3 h =0 .4 h =0 .5 h =0 .6 h =0 .7 h =0 .8 h =0 .9
weq move 100.45 100.00 100.44 101.26 move move move move
Hnew
t qt/ ˆ wt move 0.21 0.31 0.41 0.51 move move move move
stockt move 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11 move move move move
3ybondt move 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.79 move move move move
10ybondt move −0.12 −0.10 −0.07 −0.01 move move move move
casht move −0.04 −0.14 −0.25 −0.39 move move move move
21other state variables.
At any time an investor has the possibility to move to the house size that is optimal
given the values of the other state variables. However, because moving involves transaction
costs, there is range for the housing to wealth ratio where the investor optimally chooses
not to move. For the γ =3investor this is h ∈ [0.2,0.8]. When the housing to wealth ratio
is outside this range, he will optimally choose to move to a house that brings him inside the
range again. The range is more narrow for the more risk averse γ =9investor compared
to the aggressive γ =3investor. The optimal housing to wealth ratio is lower for the γ =9
investor. At this age the investor is over exposed to house price risk, considering the limited
(house price dependent) housing costs during residual life. This makes a more risk-averse
investor less willing to own a large house.
For larger housing to wealth ratios the investor can take a larger mortgage. However,
because of the required down payment, the investor has less wealth available to take long
positions in ﬁnancial assets. Recall that the size of the mortgage may not exceed 1−δ times
the housing wealth at any time, not only at moments the investor adjusts his mortgage size.
With less ﬁnancial wealth available the investor tends to shift his bond portfolio to long-
term bonds which have a larger absolute loading on real interest rate risk. Doing so he can
maintain the appropriate hedge against changing interest rates. This results in the general
tendency to increase the maturity of bond portfolio with the housing to wealth ratio. Stock
allocation tends to be crowded out more for larger housing to wealth ratios. However, there
is an additional, superposed, eﬀect that blurs the picture somewhat. Investors act less risk
averse close to the border of the no-move region than close to the optimal housing to wealth
ratio.11 In Panel A this is best visible by the high 10-year bond allocation at the left border
of the no-move region (h =0 .2). In Panels B it is more clearly visible by the slightly rising
stock allocation near the right border of the no-move region (h =0 .4 vs. h =0 .5).
5C o n c l u s i o n
I investigated housing and portfolio choice under stochastic inﬂation and real interest rates.
Both housing and ﬁnancial portfolio choice show a clear life-cycle pattern. When just
entering the labor force an investor is very borrowing constrained and prefers to rent. After
having saved for the down payment he buys a house and enjoys lower per period, per unit
11See e.g. Grossman and Laroque (1990) for a study on optimal behavior in the presence of an illliquid
asset like a house.
22housing cost. At the very end of life he starts renting again, which enables him to consume
the down payment on the previously owned house.
Young homeowners choose an ARM and invest ﬁnancial wealth mainly in stocks. At
retirement bonds play an important role, mainly as hedge against changes in the real interest
rate. The mean-reversion in the real interest rate is faster than in the expected inﬂation
rate. This implies that the sensitivity to real interest rate shocks relative to the sensitivity
to expected inﬂation rate shocks will be higher for short-term bonds than for long-term
bonds. The absolute sensitivity to both shocks is higher for a long-term bond though. An
aggressive investor, who is still very ﬁnancially constrained at retirement, mainly chooses
10-year bonds for the hedge against real interest rates and continues to ﬁnance his house
with an ARM. A more risk-averse investor prefers short-term bonds to hedge real interest
changes and switches to a hybrid mortgage, being a combination of an ARM and an FRM.
The choice on mortgage type is ﬁrst and foremost a choice between diﬀerent interest
rate products and, as I showed, should therefore be analysed in conjunction with the other
ﬁnancial decisions. However, there might be additional eﬀects from which I abstracted in
the current analysis. First, the payments on an FRM are higher than on an ARM for a
normal, upward-sloping, nominal interest rate curve. In countries where mortgage payments
are tax deductible this might result in larger tax beneﬁts for homeowners ﬁnancing their
house with an FRM. Second, holders of an FRM might have a prepayment option, which
in turn will give rise to a premium on the mortgage payments. Third, in reality some
homeowners default on their mortgage. Incoporating these eﬀects is a challenging avenue
for future research.
6 References
Bernheim, Douglas D. (1991), How strong are bequest motives? Evidence based on esti-
mates of the demand for life insurance and annuities, Journal of Political Economy,
99(5), 899-927.
Bodie, Zvi, Robert C. Merton, William F. Samuelson (1992), Labor supply ﬂexibility and
portfolio choice in a life cycle model, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 16,
427-449.
Brennan, Michael J., and Yihong Xia (2002), Dynamic asset allocation under inﬂation,
Journal of Finance, 57 (3), 1201-1238.
23Brueckner, Jan K. (1997), Consumption and investment motives and the portfolio choices
of homeowners, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 15(2), 159-180.
Campbell, John Y., and João F. Cocco (2003), Household risk management and optimal
mortgage choice, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), 1449-1494.
Campbell, John Y., and Luis M. Viceira (2002), Strategic asset allocation: portfolio choice
for long-term investors,N e wY o r k :O x f o r dU n i v e r s i t yp r e s s .
Campbell, John Y., and Luis M. Viceira (2001), Who should buy long-term bonds?, Amer-
ican Economic Review, 91(1), 99-127.
Cauley, Stephen Day, Andrey D. Pavlov, and Eduardo S. Schwartz (2005), Homeownership
as a constraint on asset allocation, Working Paper.
Cocco, Joao F. (2005), Portfolio choice in the presence of housing, Review of Financial
Studies, 18(2), 535-567.
Cocco, João F., Francisco J. Gomes, Pascal J. Maenhout (2005), Consumption and port-
folio choice over the life-cycle, Review of Financial Studies, 18(2), 491-533.
Flavin, Marjorie, and Takashi Yamashita (2002), Owner-occupied housing and the com-
position of the household portfolio, American Economic Review, 92, 345-362.
Grossman, Stanford J., and Guy Laroque (1990), Asset pricing and optimal portfolio choice
in the presence of illiquid durable consumption goods, Econometrica, 58 (1), 25-51.
Hu, Xiaoqing (2005), Portfolio Choices for Homeowners, Journal of Urban Economics,
58(1), 114-136.
Hurd, Michael D. (1989), Mortality risk and bequests, Econometrica, 57(4),779-813.
Koijen, Ralph S.J., Theo E. Nijman, Bas J.M. Werker (2006), Labor income and the
demand for long-term bonds, Working Paper.
Lustig, Hanno N., and Stijn G. van Nieuwerburgh (2005), Housing collateral, consumption
insurance, and risk premia: an empirical perspective, Journal of Finance, 60(3), 1167-
1219.
Munk, Claus and Carsten Sørensen (2005), Dynamic asset allocation with stochastic in-
come and interest rates, Working Paper.
24Nelder, J.A. and R. Mead (1965), A simplex method for function minimization, Computer
Journal, 7, 308-313.
Piazessi, Monika, Martin Schneider, and Selale Tuzel (2006), Housing, consumption, and
asset pricing, Forthcoming in the Journal of Financial Economics.
Sangvinatsos, Antonios, and Jessica A. Wachter (2005), Does the failure of the expectations
hypothesis matter for long-term investors?, Journal of Finance, 60(1), 179-230.
Sinai, Todd, and Nicholas S. Souleles (2005), Onwer-occupied housing as a hedge against
rent risk, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2), 763-789.
Van Hemert, De Jong and Driessen (2005), Dynamic portfolio and mortgage choice for
homeowners, Working Paper.
Viceira, Luis M. (2001), Optimal portfolio choice for long-horizon investors with nontrad-
able labor income, Journal of Finance, 56 (2), 433-470.
Yao, Rui, and Harold H. Zhang (2005), Optimal consumption and portfolio choices with
risky housing and borrowing constraint, Review of Financial Studies, 18(1), 197-239.
25 SIFR Research Report Series
All reports can be downloaded from our website www.sifr.org, under the heading Re-
search. Reports no. 1-15 are also available in print. In order to obtain copies of printed
reports, please send your request to info@sifr.org with detailed ordering information.
1. Foreigners’ Trading and Price Effects Across Firms
Magnus Dahlquist and G¨ oran Robertsson, December 2001
2. Hedging Housing Risk
Peter Englund, Min Hwang, and John M. Quigley, December 2001
3. Winner’s Curse in Discriminatory Price Auctions: Evidence from the
Norwegian Treasury Bill Auctions
Geir Høidal Bjønnes, December 2001
4. U.S. Exchange Rates and Currency Flows
Dagﬁnn Rime, December 2001
5. Reputation and Interdealer Trading. A Microstructure Analysis of the
Treasury Bond Market
Massimo Massa and Andrei Simonov, December 2001
6. Term Structures in the Ofﬁce Rental Market in Stockholm
˚ Ake Gunnelin and Bo S¨ oderberg, April 2002
7. What Factors Determine International Real Estate Security Returns?
Foort Hamelink and Martin Hoesli, September 2002
8. Expropriation Risk and Return in Global Equity Markets
Ravi Bansal and Magnus Dahlquist, November 2002
9. The Euro Is Good After All: Corporate Evidence
Arturo Bris, Yrj¨ o Koskinen, and Mattias Nilsson, November 2002
10. Which Investors Fear Expropriation? Evidence from Investors’ Stock Picking
Mariassunta Giannetti and Andrei Simonov, November 2002
11. Corporate Governance and the Home Bias
Magnus Dahlquist, Lee Pinkowitz, Ren´ e M. Stulz, and Rohan Williamson,
November 2002
12. Implicit Forward Rents as Predictors of Future Rents
Peter Englund, ˚ Ake Gunnelin, Martin Hoesli, and Bo S¨ oderberg,
November 2002
13. Accounting Anomalies and Information Uncertainty
Jennifer Francis, Ryan LaFond, Per Olsson, and Katherine Schipper, June 2003
14. Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: Evidence From Venture
Capitalist Analyses
Steven N. Kaplan and Per Str¨ omberg, June 200315. Valuing Corporate Liabilities
Jan Ericsson and Joel Reneby, June 2003
16. Rental Expectations and the Term Structure of Lease Rates
Eric Clapham and ˚ Ake Gunnelin, October 2003
17. Dealer Behavior and Trading Systems in Foreign Exchange Markets
Geir Høidal Bjønnes and Dagﬁnn Rime, December 2003
18. C-CAPM and the Cross-Section of Sharpe Ratios
Paul S¨ oderlind, December 2003
19. Is there Evidence of Pessimism and Doubt in Subjective Distributions?
A Comment on Abel
Paolo Giordani and Paul S¨ oderlind, December 2003
20. One for the Gain, Three for the Loss
Anders E. S. Anderson, May 2004
21. Hedging, Familiarity and Portfolio Choice
Massimo Massa and Andrei Simonov, May 2004
22. The Market Pricing of Accruals Quality
Jennifer Francis, Ryan LaFond, Per Olsson, and Katherine Schipper, May 2004
23. Privatization and Stock Market Liquidity
Bernardo Bortolotti, Frank de Jong, Giovanna Nicodano, and Ibolya Schindele,
June 2004
24. Pseudo Market Timing: Fact or Fiction?
Magnus Dahlquist and Frank de Jong, June 2004
25. All Guts, No Glory: Trading and Diversiﬁcation among Online Investors
Anders E. S. Anderson, June 2004
26. The Evolution of Security Designs
Thomas H. Noe, Michael J. Rebello, and Jun Wang, September 2004
27. The Credit Cycle and the Business Cycle: New Findings Using the Loan Ofﬁcer
Opinion Survey
Cara Lown and Donald P. Morgan, September 2004
28. How Do Legal Differences and Learning Affect Financial Contracts?
Steven N. Kaplan, Frederic Martel, and Per Str¨ omberg, September 2004
29. Advice and Monitoring: Venture Financing with Multiple Tasks
Ibolya Schindele, September 2004
30. Bank Integration and State Business Cycles
Donald Morgan, Bertrand Rime, and Philip E. Strahan, September 2004
31. Dynamic Trading Strategies and Portfolio Choice
Ravi Bansal, Magnus Dahlquist, and Campbell R. Harvey, October 200432. The Determinants of Credit Default Swap Premia
Jan Ericsson, Kris Jacobs, and Rodolfo Oviedo-Helfenberger, February 2005
33. On the Strategic Use of Debt and Capacity in Imperfectly Competitive
Product Markets
J. Chris Leach, Nathalie Moyen, and Jing Yang, February 2005
34. Call Options and Accruals Quality
Jennifer Francis, Per Olsson, and Katherine Schipper, February 2005
35. Which Past Returns Affect Trading Volume?
Markus Glaser and Martin Weber, October 2005
36. What are Firms? Evolution from Birth to Public Companies
Steven N. Kaplan, Berk A. Sensoy, and Per Str¨ omberg, October 2005
37. Security Design with Investor Private Information
Ulf Axelson, October 2005
38. ’Large’ vs. ’Small’ Players: A Closer Look at the Dynamics of Speculative Attacks
Geir H. Bjønnes, Steinar Holden, Dagﬁnn Rime, and Haakon O.Aa. Solheim,
December 2005
39. C-CAPM without Ex Post Data
Paul S¨ oderlind, December 2005
40. Overconﬁdence and Trading Volume
Markus Glaser and Martin Weber, December 2005
41. Golden Handshakes: Separation Pay for Retired and Dismissed CEOs
David Yermack, February 2006
42. Arbitrage in the Foreign Exchange Market: Turning on the Microscope
Q. Farooq Akram, Dagﬁnn Rime, and Lucio Sarno, February 2006
43. Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial Compensation
Rangarajan K. Sundaram and David L. Yermack, February 2006
44. Life-Cycle Housing and Portfolio Choice with Bond Markets
Otto van Hemert, September 2006